I think it’s more correct to say dialectical materialism is a subset of materialist philosophy. It’s not a dualist philosophy because the mental realm is not conceived of as a separate thing. Rather information and ideas are embedded in the complex chemistry of the human brain.
I think the true utility of dialectics to Marx was that it allowed him to intuit how change actually occurs in our material world without relying on the science of thermodynamics which didn’t exist yet.
I think the true utility of dialectics to Marx was that it allowed him to intuit how change actually occurs in our material world without relying on the science of thermodynamics which didn’t exist yet.
It’s more than just thermodynamics. I don’t think dialects can simply be reduced to science (that is positivism, which marx rejected). It might be better to say that dialects is the philosophy of science.
Plus, marx was well aware of thermodynamics. In fact, the whole idea of labor-power was inspired by horse-power. And value was conceived of as the economic analogue of work.
Science doesn’t not have to be positivist. I think most scientists actually understand that. For example the laws of thermodynamics break down at a quantum level and we’re still trying to come up with and test better models that can incorporate that new information.
What I mean to say about the laws of thermodynamics is they are incredibly useful in describing how and why things change. These were not all worked out when Marx was developing his theories. Yes, Marx and Engels were up to date with the science of their time and they make reference to work and power. However they lacked an understanding of entropy if only because scientists had only begun to experiment with the concept. That’s very clear especially if you read Engels’s Dialectic of Nature. In it he explicitly argues against ideas that would come to be core to the science of thermodynamics.
That’s all to say I suspect if those developments in physics had occurred maybe 40 years earlier, Marx would have formulated a much more precise concept of value. Then maybe he wouldn’t have needed to write so much about linen coats.
I think it’s more correct to say dialectical materialism is a subset of materialist philosophy. It’s not a dualist philosophy because the mental realm is not conceived of as a separate thing
This line of thinking indicates the assumption that the only type of idealism is the sort that posits that only matter and ‘mental’ non-material stuff exists. There are other types, including ones that do not consider said ‘mental’ stuff to exist.
I myself, for example, fall under the camp of considering non-material non-mental stuff to exist, in addition to mental stuff. I consider some, but not all, of the former to have no dependencies on material stuff, with material stuff being dependent on such, and that all mental stuff depends on material stuff. I am yet to find any sort of conflicts with Marxism on these grounds (or in general, sans, perhaps, some wording that is used by Marx or other people).
I think it’s more correct to say dialectical materialism is a subset of materialist philosophy. It’s not a dualist philosophy because the mental realm is not conceived of as a separate thing. Rather information and ideas are embedded in the complex chemistry of the human brain.
I think the true utility of dialectics to Marx was that it allowed him to intuit how change actually occurs in our material world without relying on the science of thermodynamics which didn’t exist yet.
Yup. I should have added that part but forgot.
It’s more than just thermodynamics. I don’t think dialects can simply be reduced to science (that is positivism, which marx rejected). It might be better to say that dialects is the philosophy of science.
Plus, marx was well aware of thermodynamics. In fact, the whole idea of labor-power was inspired by horse-power. And value was conceived of as the economic analogue of work.
Science doesn’t not have to be positivist. I think most scientists actually understand that. For example the laws of thermodynamics break down at a quantum level and we’re still trying to come up with and test better models that can incorporate that new information.
What I mean to say about the laws of thermodynamics is they are incredibly useful in describing how and why things change. These were not all worked out when Marx was developing his theories. Yes, Marx and Engels were up to date with the science of their time and they make reference to work and power. However they lacked an understanding of entropy if only because scientists had only begun to experiment with the concept. That’s very clear especially if you read Engels’s Dialectic of Nature. In it he explicitly argues against ideas that would come to be core to the science of thermodynamics.
That’s all to say I suspect if those developments in physics had occurred maybe 40 years earlier, Marx would have formulated a much more precise concept of value. Then maybe he wouldn’t have needed to write so much about linen coats.
This line of thinking indicates the assumption that the only type of idealism is the sort that posits that only matter and ‘mental’ non-material stuff exists. There are other types, including ones that do not consider said ‘mental’ stuff to exist.
I myself, for example, fall under the camp of considering non-material non-mental stuff to exist, in addition to mental stuff. I consider some, but not all, of the former to have no dependencies on material stuff, with material stuff being dependent on such, and that all mental stuff depends on material stuff. I am yet to find any sort of conflicts with Marxism on these grounds (or in general, sans, perhaps, some wording that is used by Marx or other people).