WilliamJenningsBryanJonestownMassacre [none/use name]

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Joined 28 days ago
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Cake day: May 15th, 2026

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  • you don’t get it, this is an important signal to send to the market, so that, uh, well, you, see, it’s more efficient, this allows things to be more efficient, for stakeholders, um

    think of it this way: imagine that it’s not just this kid, it’s an entire ecosystem of traders, such that there’s an efficient market trading on this intersection-passing instrument. and, now, it’s not just this singular intersection-passing instrument, but it’s on an entire portfolio of intersection-instruments, each one with sufficient number of traders who make the trading of each singular instrument, efficient. and so, um, you have, uh, essentially, a mapping of a logistics network, which will provide an accurate estimate of the amount of the time to travel through the network, kinda. and so, if have an equity stake in the logistical network, like you’re UPS, you can hedge against, say, a snow storm, delaying all your shipping. so that’s good. and, uh, this would also create positive incentives, to make travel through the network more efficient, because stakeholders who were, you know, least cost bearers, they could, uh alter their conduct thanks to the financial incentive – townships could reduce wasteful pedestrian crossing times, to allow more cars through; or, even, you know, a parcel carrier could drive more conscientiously, quickly to get through intersections. and, okay, sure there could be some perverse incentives – i guess it’s possible that a parcel carrier could more easily, well, just stop right before the intersection, having a short position on an intersection-passing instrument, but, well, regulators. regulators could step in, and monitor every vehicle that passes through any of these intersections, at every time of crossing. so every vehicle, every person would need to make representations regarding their held intersection-passing instruments, so that way traders could know ahead of time, uh, they could integrate that into their position calculations. (and i hear you, but it wouldn’t even need to be government regulators – imagine, if you will, the set of traders, each of whom would be better off if there were an impartial body – see, what they could do is, they could get together, and well, together they could privately create mechanisms which, well, i digress.)

    but really this is a great innovation to help reduce friction, to reduce transaction costs. and sure, but uh, for now, let’s ignore out unaddressed effects of moral hazard from imperfect regulation, and regulation costs. okay, and just, uh, let’s also just bracket out the opportunity costs, for now, let’s just, assume, this kid couldn’t contribute otherwise to the economy. if this kid is a poor trader, he will leave the trading market. so by definition, if he’s trading, this is a pareto optimal for him. and for the traders, who are, well, less lucky or talented, we will still tax these trades, and so, you know, kids who prove unsuccessful, we can still provide social services for them. or, you know, uh, well, that’s a political choice which we don’t need to address right here, but, hypothetically, all that matters is that the economy is more efficient, and we can make determinations as to distribution of resources later. so this is a very good idea, thank you.